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Weatherlessness: Affect, Mood, 
Temperament, the Death of the Will, and 
Politics 
First, I develop an account of the nature of moods and the relation of mood to emotion 
and temperament. This account stresses that social and individual moods are marked 
by four features: They are transactional - neither wholly subjective nor objective; in 
experience they shade into and blur back and forth with feeling and temperament; they are 
ambient and atmospheric, a habit of living ·in the world more expansive than a habit of 
mind; and, whether conscious or not, moods have causes that, if known, may be 
manipulated to advance both personal and political ends. Second, I focus on a particular 
mood that, following the novelist John Barth, I term "weatherlessness." I then 
distinguish weatherlessness from both learned helplessness and manufactured consent. 
Third, I conclude by showing ways in which weatherlessness is fatal to democracy, to 
government of, by, and for the people. Here I suggest ways in which weatherlessness can 
be a tool used by authoritarian regimes, including those that disguise themselves as 
democracies. 
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1. Moods 
Supposing that truth is a mood- what 
then? Supposing every philosophy and every 
politics expresses the mood of its originators-
what then? 
OK, don't even try to answer these 
questions, don't even start to read this ~ssay 
until you're in the right mood. Followmg a 
good sleep and healthy breakfast. Your mouth 
holding a pen crosswise, not by its end. A 
sunny day and pleasant breeze, maybe some 
exercise or some time in the park. When you 
want to be right here, right where you are. 
After an ocean of love. That could make all 
the difference. And this difference . is not 
merely personal: Associations, organizations, 
governments, and cultures call forth., are 
marked by, and nourish or starve particular 
moods. Moods may be political; they may be 
manipulated to advance both personal and 
political ends. 
What is a mood? With roots in Old 
English, Gothic German, and Old Norse 
words for mind, spirit, courage, and anger, 
mood is typically defined as an individu~l 's 
particular and temporary feeling or state of mmd, 
a distinctive emotional quality or tone, a 
pervading impression or general attitude or tone of 
some thing or some time, and a person's 
inclination or disposition or receptivity or temper 
to some activity or thing. (The term also has 
specialized and precise meanings i~ logic (as 
classification of categorical syllogtsms) and 
grammar (as categories of verb inflection to 
indicate syntactic relations among clauses or 
attitudes of speakers with respect to 
certainty I uncertainty, wish/ command, a~d 
emphasis/hesitancy. I note here that the m~m 
character discussed in this essay's next sectwn 
is a grammar teacher - in part a teacher of 
moods.) Mood is most often attributed to 
individuals, but a mood may be a feature of a 
social group, political regime, or historical era 
- e.g., the mood of a people during a wa~ or 
the mood of an age of enlightenment or hme 
of famine - or to creative works - e.g., the 
characteristic mood of a painter's period of 
work or the tone of a piece of music - or a 
location - e.g., the mood of a military 
cemetery or the feel of a lake house. In her 
song, "Ventura," Lucinda Williams (2003) 
sings: 
Haven't spoken to no one 
Haven't been in the mood 
Pour some soup, get a spoon and 
Stir it up real good. 
Sometimes "mood" is used almost 
synonymously with "feeling" or "emotion"-
such that, for example, to be in a good mood 
is simply to feel cheerful or have positive 
emotions and to be in a bad mood is to feel 
irritated or suffer from negative emotions. 
Many psychologists, however, differentiate 
emotion and mood. In these cases, an emotion 
or "emotional episode" is characterized as an 
experience marked by: a particular (usually 
relatively short-term) quality and caused by 
particular physiological (e.g., neurol~?ical 
and endocrinal) changes and condthons; 
behaviors (e.g.; smiling or running away) 
caused by and consistent with this experience; 
attention directed toward an eliciting 
stimulus; cognitive appraisal of the meaning 
and possible consequences of the stimulus; 
and, attribution of the genesis of the 
experience to the stimulus. An important 
point here is that emotions are not reacti,ons to 
perceptions and then, afterwards, th~ caus~ of 
bodily expressions. Instead, perceptions gtve 
rise to bodily expressions the awareness of 
which is emotion. William James (1981 [1890]) 
put this nicely: "Bodily changes follow 
directly the perception of the exciting fact, 
and . . . our feeling of the same changes as 
they occur is the emotion." We feel sorry 
because we cry and afraid because we 
tremble, James explained; we do not cry 
because we feel sorry or tremble because we 
are afraid. Without the bodily expressions 
following perception, those perceptions 
would be wholly cognitive - we might judge 
it best to run but we "should not actually feel 
afraid" (1065-66). So characterized, emotions 
are brought about by something, are feelings of 
bodily reactions to something, and are about 
something cognitively appraised. Examples 
include anger, fear, sadness, happiness, 
disgust, and surprise. Indeed, many 
researchers argue that these are the six, and 
only, universal emotions. That may be right, 
but I'd like to think that the sentiment of 
rationality - James's phrase for the fact that 
rationality itself is a sentiment - might be 
very widespread too. 
By contrast, a mood is characterized as 
an affective state that lasts longer than an 
emotion and often is temporally distant from 
the stimulus and its resulting behavior that is 
its cause (e.g., waking up one morning in a 
bad mood because of an argument several 
months earlier or being depressed years after 
the death of a loved one). This includes 
moods brought on by causes unrecognized by 
the given individual - causes such as 
nutrition, weather, facial muscles, physical 
activity, persistent poverty, a culture of 
violence, structural absence of opportunity, 
and so on. A mood is more diffuse and 
general than an emotion - less about 
something in particular that is cognitively 
appraised and more about everything in 
general (e.g., anxiety not about an important 
exam in an hour but about one's whole 
future); less a reaction to something in 
particular than a reaction to life more 
generally (e.g., irritability brought on not by 
one particular co-worker but by absolutely 
everyone around); and less brought on by 
something particular but, instead, more 
sustained across many different particular 
experiences (e.g., a depressive state due to the 
totality of one's self). So characterized, 
moods are relatively long term, broad scope, 
and diffuse affective states. From this 
perspective, moods are generally viewed as 
having two primary dimensions or valences: 
positive affect (and the positive consequences 
Vol. 28: Affect 
of this affect) and negative affect (and the 
negative consequences of this affect); that is, 
being in a good mood or being in a bad 
mood. Examples of moods include 
depression, anxiety, resignation, confidence, 
and serenity. 
I accept and want to make use of the 
notion of mood understood in this brief, 
unfinished but, I hope, workable sketch. That 
said, I also want to add four important points 
to this account of mood. First, any adequate 
account of mood must be shady. This means it 
must not claim neat separations between 
instincts, emotions, moods, and 
temperaments. Rather, they blur into one 
another. To note this is simply to extend an 
observation by James (1981 [1890]): 
"Instinctive reactions and emotional 
expressions thus shade imperceptibly into 
each other" (1058). So too do emotions, 
moods, and temperaments. We can feel 
hopeful or be in a hopeful mood or have a 
hopeful temperament. Somebody can just be 
an anxious person, find one's self in an 
anxious mood, or feel anxious. As James (1981 
[1890]) noted, "The result of all this flux is 
that the merely descriptive literature of the 
emotions is one of the most tedious parts of 
psychology. And not only is it tedious, but 
you feel that its subdivisions are to a great 
extent either fictitious or unimportant, and 
that its pretences to accuracy are a sham" 
(1064). Differences in both life and language 
among instincts, emotions, moods, and 
temperaments are shady, blurry, vague. An 
emotion can coexist with or produce a mood 
or a temperament over time, but so too a 
mood can call forth and exist simultaneously 
with a particular emotion. 
I go out with a friend 
Maybe a little music might help 
But I can't pretend 
I wish I was somewhere else (Williams 
2003). 
Second, any adequate account of mood 
must be transactional. This means that moods 
TEXAS 
are not wholly subjective or wholly objective. 
Rather, they are what James called 
"double-barreled," applying to both the how 
and the what of experience, features of 
irreducibly interrelated consciousness and 
object. Moods are what John Dewey (1989 
[1949]) called "unfractured" -without radical 
separation between knower and known, 
namer and named, organism and 
environment, subject and object (96-97). For 
Heidegger as for Dewey, moods are features 
of a world, not simply subjective overlays or 
reactions to it. Just as Dewey asserted that 
reality possesses practical character, so too it 
possesses affective character. Reality is 
moody. Our ordinary language captures this 
and displays our unsettlement about our 
being in a mood or a mood being in us. Place: 
The dark streets were foreboding, tense, 
unforgiving, full of danger, without hope. 
Action: The gunfire was terrifying, scary, 
frightening, horrific. Person: After her death, 
he was disconsolate, depressed, unable to 
cope, dark, without joy. Time: "Ah distinctly, I 
remember, it was in the bleak December," the 
mood was grim, there were shootings almost 
every day, it was a dismal period. The 
affective is thick and stretches across our 
lives. In now-outdated language, tertiary 
qualities are features of reality - and that 
includes emotion, mood, and temperament. 
Mood colors, fixes, and transforms both the 
how and the what of experience. 
Third, affect includes more than instinct, 
feeling, and mood. It is ambient and 
atmospheric. It also includes temperament. By 
temperament I mean not just a person's or a 
group's habit of mind, but something more 
expansive - one's habit of living, one's 
constitution or characteristic modes of feeling 
and action. As feelings come and go and 
shade into more diffuse moods that may last a 
while or longer, so too moods often shade and 
blur into temperaments. In such cases, moods 
become habitual in duration and wide in 
scope - affective undergoings, doings, and 
dispositions across wide swaths of one's life. 
They become whole climates rather than the 
weather one particular day or even one 
season. This points to another standard or 
dictionary meaning of "temperament" that 
sheds additional light: temperament is the 
condition of the weather or climate, regarded 
as resulting from a combination of heat or 
cold, dryness or humidity. One's 
temperament is one's personal weather. We 
all know some people who are warm, others 
who are cold, some who are arid, and yet 
others who are stormy (and so on). 
Understood this way, temperament shares 
more with feeling and less with mood a 
connection with action and disposition to 
action. Icy feelings and an icy temperament 
are called forth and displayed in icy behavior; 
an icy mood is more atmospheric - "I had no 
idea you were in that kind of mood!" -and 
may be barely evident in action. Affects blur 
along a temporal arc of shorter-term feelings, 
longer-lasting moods, and relatively durable 
tern peramen ts. 
The fourth point about moods is this: 
They have causes. They are the product of 
physiological, environmental, and cultural 
conditions. The fact that a person may not 
know what brought on a mood (e.g., "I have 
no idea why I'm in such an unhappy mood") 
does not mean that the existence of the mood 
is irreducibly mysterious or unknowable. Just 
as it is possible to manufacture feelings (e.g., 
"If I let her in on this secret, she will be so 
jealous"), so too it is possible to manufacture 
moods (e.g., "We had to get out of the Pacific 
Northwest to cure his seasonal affective 
disorder," or, "Whenever the manager turned 
on Fox News, I felt anger at Trump and my 
whole mood turned confrontational and 
hostile"). This has potential practical 
implications for anyone marketing products, 
ideas, or regimes - or even philosophies if one 
accepts Deleuze and Guattari's (1994 [1991]) 
observation that "philosophy has not 
remained unaffected by the general 
movement that replaced Critique with sales 
promotion" (10). As it is possible to inflame a 
crowd, create desires, learn emotions and 
emotional responses, produce belief, and 
engineer consent, so it is possible to 
manufacture mood - crucial perhaps in some 
kinds of administration of populations. 
Individual and social moods, then, are 
shady and transactional, blurring back and 
forth with feeling and temperament, and 
caused by conditions that, if known, may be 
manipulated to advance both personal and 
political ends. 
2. Weatherlessness 
In light of this general understanding of 
mood, I want to focus briefly on a particular 
mood for the purpose of reflecting on its 
origins and its political as well as personal 
uses. I take the name for this mood -
weatherlessness- from the novelist John Barth. 
To be weatherless is to be in a moodless 
mood, to be without climate, without feeling, 
freedom, or purpose. When habitual, it is the 
complete absence of disposition and 
inclination, the absence of any temperament. 
It is to be helpless, unable to act and without 
desires or goals, paralyzed to the point of 
inaction. Just as Hemingway recorded the 
death of love after World War I in The Sun 
Also Rises, so Barth recounted the death of the 
will after World War II in his 1958 novel, The 
End of the Road (1969 [1958]). Hemingway 
chronicled the "lost generation" while Barth 
illuminated the "submission generation." For 
the book's "hero," Jacob Horner, there is no 
convincing reason to prefer or do anything 
and so he does nothing (except at the 
command of the "Doctor," a 
psychiatrist-counselor-men tor-God, as 
impersonal, aloof, and inexplicable as fate). 
The book opens with a six-word 
sentence suggesting uncertainty and 
absurdity: "In a sense, I am Jacob Horner" 
(Barth 1969 [1958], 1). Next: "It was on the 
advice of the Doctor that I entered the 
teaching profession." The mood of 
weatherlessness and a temperament of 
paralysis are set quickly: Readers are treated 
to two long paragraphs dealing solemnly 
with the vexing problems of how to sit 
properly in the Doctor's office and the equally 
grave problem of how one's arms should be 
placed. After discussing the shifting of 
positions and arms, Jacob Horner tells us that 
the story of his life is contained in the 
sentence which says that this shifting is a 
"recognition of the fact that when one is faced 
with such a multitude of desirable choices, no 
one choice seems satisfactory for very long by 
comparison with the aggregate desirability of 
all the rest, though compared to any one of 
the others it would not be found inferior." 
This sentence, which Jacob Horner describes 
as "a double predicate nominative expression 
in the second independent clause of a rather 
intricate compound sentence" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 2-3), not only shows that Horner is a 
grammar teacher but also reveals Barth's 
contempt for conventional rules and societal 
customs, for sense and order, for logic and 
principles. Jacob Horner's mastery of these 
techniques was no avail against his 
impotency. 
You like it under the trees in autumn, 
Because everything is half dead 
The wind moves like a cripple among the 
leaves 
And repeats words without meaning. 
... you yourself were never quite yourself 
And did not want nor have to be, 
Desiring the exhilarations of changes: 
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from 
The weight of primary noon, 
The ABC of being (Stevens 1993 [1947], 
288). 
Factually and briefly, The End of the Road 
is a story supposedly written by Jake Horner 
in 1955 about an incident, which took place in 
1953, an event caused by the advice of the 
strange Doctor whom Horner met in 1951 and 
with whom he is doomed to serve the rest of 
his aimless, empty life. The novel opens with 
the Doctor's advice to Jake Horner to go to 
third-rate Wicomico State Teachers College in 
Maryland's Eastern Shore to get a job 
teaching grammar. At Wicomico, Jake's first 
and only friend is Joe Morgan, a liberal 
academic "emancipated" from objective 
values: "What the hell, Jake," says Joe, "when 
you say good-by to objective values, you 
really have to flex your muscles and keep 
your eyes open, because you're on your own. 
It takes energy; not just personal energy, but 
cultural energy, or you're lost. Energy's what 
makes the difference between American 
pragmatism and French existentialism -
where the hell else but in America could you 
have a cheerful nihilism, for God's sake?" 
(Barth 1969 [1958], 47). Jake had also said 
goodbye to objective values -after all, he had 
been ordered by the Doctor to read Sartre and 
to be an existentialist and instructed that 
"Choosing is existence: To the extent you 
don't choose, you don't exist" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 83) - but he did not accept Joe's 
cheerful spirit. He had no experience of 
himself as a unified self. Jake claimed: 
"Indeed, the conflict between individual 
points of view that Joe admitted lay close to 
heart of his subjectivism I should carry even 
further, for subjectivism implies a self, and 
where one feels a plurality of selves, one is 
subject to the same conflict on an intensely 
intramural level, each of one's selves claiming 
the same irrefutable validity for its special 
point of view that, in Joe's system individuals 
and institutions may claim" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 142). Here Barth pokes fun at the 
American Dream, American progressivism, 
and meliorism that smile in the face of 
adversity and hope for better things ahead. 
Jake does not smile. He is immobilized, 
helpless, sapped of will, doomed to 
immobility and living what Wallace Stevens 
(1993 [1949]) characterized as a "skeleton's 
life" in" As You Leave the Room": 
I wonder, have I lived a skeleton's life, 
As a disbeliever in reality, 
A countryman of all the bones in the 
world? 
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten 
becomes 
Part of a major reality, part of 
An appreciation of a reality 
And yet nothing has been changed except 
what is 
Unreal, as if nothing had been changed at 
all (488). 
Joe kept pushing his wife, Rennie, 
toward Jake and found ways for them to 
spend time together. When he learns of their 
affair, Joe makes it the subject of long, open 
philosophical conversations, as he does when 
Rennie becomes pregnant (whether by Jake or 
Joe no one knows). After a discussion of death 
as the only alternative to bearing the 
unwanted child, the three discuss another 
alternative, abortion. Jake's Doctor agrees to 
perform the abortion, the price being 
complete ownership of Jake for the rest of his 
life. Rennie is killed on the operating table, 
leaving Jake to break the news to Joe. Joe 
disappears into oblivion while Jake departs 
by taxi for the Doctor's Remobilization Farm 
where he is fated to live his life in complete 
dependence on, and total submission to, the 
Doctor. The book's final word- Jake says this 
to the driver - is "Terminal" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 198). 
Weatherlessness: After recounting a 
dream in which a meteorologist announces 
that there simply will be no weather 
tomorrow, Jake says this: 
A day without weather is unthinkable, but 
for me at least there were frequently days 
without any mood at all. On these days, 
Jacob Horner, except in a meaningless 
metabolistic sense, ceased to exist, for I was 
without a personality. Like those 
microscopic specimens that biologists must 
dye in order to make them visible at all, I 
had to be colored with some mood or other 
if there was to be a recognizable self to me. 
The fact that my successive and 
discontinuous selves were linked to one 
another by the two unstable threads of 
body and memory; the fact that in the 
nature of Western languages the word 
disClosure 
change presupposes something upon 
which the changes operate; the fact that 
although the specimen is invisible without 
the dye, the dye is not the specimen- these 
are considerations of which I was aware 
but in which I had no interest. On my 
weatherless days my body sat in a rocking 
chair and rocked and rocked and rocked, 
and my mind was as nearly empty as 
interstellar space (Barth 1969 [1958], 36). 
And like the bodies of individual persons, so 
too political bodies may sit in a rocking chair, 
just rocking and empty. 
3. Manufactured Helplessness and Politics 
Barth's novel presented a mood of 
weatherlessness, the absence of temperament 
and disposition - the death of the will- and 
the resulting paralysis and impotence of 
action primarily as an individual's (Jacob's) 
psychological condition and as a 
philosophical problem (if one makes certain 
"existentialist" assumptions about the world, 
freedom and choice, and values). I want now 
to consider weatherlessness and the death of 
the will in a more explicitly political context 
because I find these ideas illuminate central 
commitments and problems for democratic 
practice - for practices that broadly value and 
are marked by broad participation, consent, 
and benefit of the governed. To do this, it is 
necessary to view weatherlessness not simply 
as an individual trait but as a social product -
something socially manufactured (indirectly-
whether fully conscious or not - via 
sentiments) in particular ways in particular 
times and places with particular 
consequences for particular selves. The reason 
for doing this is straight-forward: the self, to 
use the language of George Herbert Mead, is 
a social product (and so there can be no 
question about mood being either only 
wholly personal or only wholly social). It is 
also necessary to view weatherlessness as a 
cultural deployment - a strategy (conscious or 
not) on behalf of particular interests and 
Vol. 28: Affect 
powers, particular forms of government, and 
particular cultural relations. 
In this light, it is helpful to contrast 
weatherlessness and the death of the will with 
two other phenomena: learned helplessness 
and manufactured consent. Following 
Seligman (1975a, 1975b, and 1993), learned 
helplessness is a condition in which a person, 
after a traumatic experience or repeated harm 
and failure, learns powerlessness and absence 
of control and then gives up even trying, 
taking no action to avoid subsequent harm -
even in subsequent changed conditions in 
which the harm could be escaped or stopped. 
Two points stand out here: the helplessness 
learned in the original situation is warranted 
- the subject actually is helpless with respect 
to the given trauma or harm; and, in later 
changed conditions, the habituated 
helplessness does not appear warranted to 
third-party observers who know surely the 
conditions have changed such that the person 
is no longer helpless, but it does appear 
warranted to the person who has no reason to 
realize that conditions have changed - and 
who finally does act to avoid trauma or harm 
only after being shown that this is possible. In 
learned helplessness, then, the self first 
discovers it has no effective power to act, no 
ability to achieve its goals, and then 
concludes there is no point acting. This 
paralysis of will, understood as a habit, is the 
result of actual helplessness in a given 
environment. In cases of weatherlessness, in 
contrast, the self first finds itself in an 
indifferent, no-mood mood, without 
temperament or disposition, and this mood 
washes over will, drowning it, the self then 
having no inclination to act at all. In learned 
helplessness, the self's will to act is defeated 
by its actual environment. And the self learns 
that fact. In weatherlessness, the self's will is 
defeated by its own indifferent mood and 
a-disposed temperament (and the 
physiological, environmental, and cultural 
forces that create and sustain this mood and 
temperament). And the self expresses that fact. 
The result is the same - paralysis of action; 
however, the cause is different (and, therefore, 
any remedy also would be different). 
Manufactured consent, following 
Lippmann (who coined the term in his 1922 
Public Opinion) and Herman and Chomsky 
(who took it up in their 1968 Manufacturing 
Consent), is the idea that formally or 
outwardly democratic regimes can support 
themselves without any overt coercion by 
employing propaganda-functioning mass 
communications that create citizen consent. 
Here the roles of the media and manufactured 
consent in a democracy are viewed as 
functionally parallel to the roles of the 
military and violence in an old-fashioned 
dictatorial or openly authoritarian regime. 
Understood in a political context, both 
manufactured consent and weatherlessness 
are societal creations. However, in these two 
cases of manufacturing, both the immediate 
producers and the resulting product are very 
different. Manufactured consent produces just 
that - consent - through the work of 
profit-driven corporations and investors who 
utilize mass media, government agencies, and 
regulation of social interactions to serve their 
private interests. Weatherlessness, on the 
other hand, produces vapid spectatorship, 
non-engagement, and non-allegiance in 
politics as a result of an indifferent mood and 
a temperament lacking all disposition. 
Weatherlessness does not manufacture 
consent or dissent; it manufactures 
a-consent, even "sleeping through a 
revolution." 
And it may well be that we will have to 
repent in this generation. Not merely for the 
vitriolic words and the violent actions of the 
bad people, but for the appalling silence and 
indifference of the good people who sit 
around and say, "Wait on time." (King, Jr. 
1968) 
Yes, but weatherlessness is not a long 
marking of time, a waiting on time. It is not 
waiting, even long-game waiting; it is only 
sitting - paralysis without expectation or 
anticipation. 
Viewed it is clear that 
weatherlessness is fatal for democracy - for 
any government of, by, and for the people. The 
point is not simply that those who are 
weatherless do not participate. That is true at 
the individual level. However, at the social 
level, weatherlessness is not simply the death 
of some individual's will. Rather, 
weatherlessness in effect is the outsourcing of 
the will, a space that allows the creation of a 
people's surrogate will. In the End of the Road, 
for example, from the novel's start at 
Wicomico State Teachers College to its end en 
route to the Remobilization Farm, Jake does 
not really himself act at all- but only on the 
instruction of, only under the control of, the 
Doctor. Weatherlessness is a means to, and a 
mark of, authoritarian political regimes. 
Here is a natural history or genealogy of 
authoritarian politics in democratic disguise: 
At first, those who will not consent must be 
rendered unable to oppose effectively - the 
work of armies, jailers, and executioners; 
then, that opposition, frequently so difficult to 
control, must be remanufactured more 
efficiently into consent - the work of 
advertisers and marketers, mass media 
professionals, and private corporations; 
finally, consen_t, frequently unable to keep 
hidden the traces of its manufacture (and so 
remain effective), must be retooled as 
weatherlessness and its paralysis of 
inclination and action - the work of mood 
managers and temperament creators via one's 
physiology, environment, and culture 
(including one's self). 
Like all forms of government, democracy is 
moody (and I think it is very useful to think of 
democracy as a mood, affect, and 
temperament rather than merely a doctrine or 
set of practices). The mood of illiberal 
democracy - external trappings of democratic 
government adopted by anti-democratic ways 
of life is, at least in large part, 
weatherlessness. In such regimes, popular 
unrest, political protest, and social action are 
mood disorders. The Doctor's message to 
Jake, Donald Trump's message to Americans, 
Xi Jinping's message to the Chinese, Viktor 
Orban's message to Hungarians, Hitler's 
message to the Germans: Trust me. When 
Trump proclaims "Make America Great 
Again," he is not laying out any platform; ~e 
is expressing and strengthening, among his 
tribe, a mood. Mood blurs into temperament. 
Temperament separated from will is an abstraction 
and without motivation. Will separated from hope 
makes hope ineffective, mere wish. This hope is a 
mood. 
I close with three points about 
weatherlessness in political contexts. First, it 
is rarely aU-or-nothing. One can be, for 
example, weatherless with respect to a 
national election but deeply concerned and 
involved with local school board issues. This 
means that if one views weatherlessness as a 
mood blurring into a feeling, there may be 
little weatherlessness. One feels the school 
shooting is tragic, feels NRA funds in politics 
are obscene, or feels perplexed by the idea of 
schoolteachers carrying guns. But if 
weatherlessness is seen as a mood shading 
toward temperament, inclination, and 
disposition, then weatherlessness clearly .is 
widespread today in American society and I.n 
other traditionally liberal and democratic 
societies. One sees the televised school 
shooting, reads about dark money in politics, 
watches pictures of the rainforest set on fire to 
clear it, drives past extreme poverty and does 
nothing -rocking with Jake Horner in one's 
chair. This is paralysis - or its practical 
equivalent. Weatherlessness is not merel~ the 
paralysis of wish; it is also the paralysis of 
action. 
Second, how is this produced? Both 
psychologically and politically. James 
described brilliantly the physical process on 
the nerves - he called it an "economy of 
nerve-paths" - by which emotion slides in~o 
inattention and indifference. (This 
explanation captures many lives to date in the 
Trump Era - and while I appreciate the 
"economy" here, I resent the difficulty of 
keeping "perturbation" alive.) Emotions, 
James (1981 [1890]) wrote, "blunt themselves by 
repetition": 
The more we exercise ourselves at 
anything, the fewer muscles we employ ... 
The first time we saw [some stimulus] we 
could perhaps neither act nor think at all, 
and had no reaction but organic 
perturbation. The emotions of startled 
surprise, wonder, or curiosity were the 
result. Now we look on with absolutely no 
emotion (1089). 
Third, finally and importantly, 
weatherlessness has more indirect cultural 
causes as well as proximate 
emotional/ physiological causes. If every 
claim is met with a counter-claim, if every fact 
is suspected on the basis of alternative facts, if 
a commitment one day is not a commitment 
the next, if all news is fake according to 
someone, if science and its critics both are 
suspect, if many voices shout many messages 
equally loudly, if every claim is a lie, there 
may come to seem to be little reason to listen 
at all. Or, it may be impossible to hear 
anything at all but collective background 
noise. Indifference in mood and in practice, 
weatherlessness, can result from there really 
being no difference among all alternatives, 
but it also can result from situations in which 
it is impossible to judge differences, 
impossible to differentiate, impossible any 
longer to look on, as James put it, with any 
emotion or care. In such cases, Joe was right 
when he told Jake that pluralism and 
democracy take political and cultural, not just 
personal, hope and effort. Hope for that effort 
is hope for conditions for a more fully 
democratic mood. 
Suddenly everyone was run over by a 
truck (O'Donoghue 1971, 16). 
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